Rawls's The Law of Peoples has not been well received. The first task of this essay is to draw (what the author regards as) Rawls's position out of his own text where it is imperfectly and incompletely expressed. Rawls's view, once fully and clearly presented, is less vulnerable to common criticisms than it is often taken to be. The second task of this essay is to go beyond Rawls's text to develop some supplementary lines of argument, still Rawlsian in spirit, to deflect key criticisms made by Rawls's critics. The overall defense given here of Rawls's position draws on a deep theme running throughout all of Rawls's work in political philosophy, namely, that the task of political philosophy is to mark the moral limits given by and through a common human reason, itself socially and historically achieved, within which human nature must develop (and reveal itself over time) if it is to be an expression or manifestation of human freedom.
I. INTRODUCTION
In The Law of Peoples (hereafter LP), John Rawls turns his attention to the question of international justice. 1 Neither his analysis nor his conclusions have been well received. 2 Indeed, it is difficult in the secondary literature to find positive or even sympathetic treatments of Rawls's work in LP. For the most part, readers of LP politely and respectfully dismiss it as thoroughly or nearly thoroughly wrongheaded.
In this essay, I defend LP. A complete defense of all its key doctrines is, of course, a task too large for a single essay. What I offer here is the beginning of such a defense. I first briefly canvas the complaints commonly made against Rawls's position. I then set out to develop two elements of Rawls's argument imperfectly and incompletely expressed in LP. My aim is to show that Rawls's position, once its central elements are more fully developed, is less vulnerable to many common complaints than is usually supposed. I then offer two related supplementary lines of argument in defense of Rawls's position, arguments Rawlsian in spirit but not to be found in LP. Both concern the relationship between real history and the moral demand for reciprocity when theorizing the demands of international justice from a liberal democratic point of view.
My hope is that this essay, taken as a whole, will force readers to consider seriously two general propositions. The first is that the position Rawls articulates and is otherwise latent in LP is richer and more powerful, systematic, and attractive than many critics have let on and therefore deserves a more careful, charitable, and sympathetic engagement than it has received to date. The second is that this position is fundamentally consistent with the basic thrust of Rawls's political philosophy as it developed over the latter half of the last century. The basic thrust I have in mind here is just this: the fundamental task of political philosophy is to chart the course we must collectively follow if the empirical, contingent, and local forces of history and politics that make us what we are are themselves to remain bounded by or confined within the content of a common human reason, itself also an empirical contingent historical achievement. This is the path of political freedom or autonomy. Rawls sought to show that we need not depart from it to arrive at justice. And he thought it crucial to make such a showing if we were to find ourselves able to replace a mere longing for justice (fertile soil for both political fanaticism and apathetic resignation) with a reasonable hope for it. 3 
II. THE COMPLAINTS
Three general complaints are commonly made against Rawls's method or analysis. The first and most general is that LP offers little by way of careful, detailed argument for its substantive conclusions. LP is, the objection goes, opaque and underdeveloped, more a laundry list of mere assertions and reflections rather than a carefully constructed argument. There is some merit to this complaint; indeed, the sort of defense given in this essay would be unnecessary were matters otherwise.
The second concerns Rawls's framing the problem of international or global justice as a problem in the first instance of the relations between "peoples" or "well-ordered peoples," by which he means those bodies politic, whether states or state-like, able to constitute themselves as corporate artificial moral agents or persons. 4 By so framing the problem, the objection goes, Rawls wrongly gives priority to the interests of peoples or corporate bodies politic, even if well-ordered, over the interests of individual human persons. All good liberals, and therefore Rawls, must give priority to the interests of individual human persons. Accordingly, in the first instance the problem of international or global justice must be understood by Rawls, as by any good liberal, as a problem of the relations between individual human persons taken prior to or independent of their membership in any particular body politic.
The third complaint against Rawls concerns his insistence on taking up the question of global or international justice first as a matter of so-called ideal theory.
5
Because of this, Rawls's view has about it, many complain, an air of unreality. Only someone with their head far too high in the clouds of ideal theory could put off discussion of global poverty and inequality for 105 pages, 90 of which are devoted to considering international justice in a world of self-sufficient, nonaggressive, and universally decent peoples with no complaints of historical injustice, conquest, and the like to press against one another. This represents, or so the complaint goes, the worst kind of political philosophy, divorced as it is from real politics.
Three general complaints also are commonly advanced against Rawls's substantive conclusions in LP. The first concerns human rights. 6 The charge is that Rawls includes in the principles of international justice too thin a doctrine of human rights and that it ought to be replaced by a more robustly liberal and democratic doctrine that affirms a human right to democratic government or political equality or to one or another egalitarian welfarist distribution of economic or material goods.
A second complaint concerns economic justice. As with human rights, the charge here too is that Rawls offers too thin a doctrine of global economic justice. He not only wrongly permits peoples to organize their domestic economies in unacceptable ways (allowing inequalities no liberal could accept, for example), he also wrongly rejects any justice-based constraints on the growth of economic inequalities between peoples within the global economy. 7 The third substantive complaint against LP is that it does not require of global and regional international institutions (e.g., the United Nations, World Trade Organization, Organization of American States, NAFTA, etc.) that they be organized internally along democratic lines. Instead, Rawls regards such institutions as voluntary associations to be structured according to the terms to which the parties, given their interests, find themselves able to agree. 8 Global and regional institutions are, then, something like the international analogue of the voluntary associations constitutive of civil society in a liberal democracy. They exist as such, however, apart from and unconstrained by any sort of world state. In the international setting, there is only global civil society, a wide range of internally diverse voluntary associations and institutions sustained by shared interests and purposes. 9 The foregoing are the general complaints most commonly lodged against LP and constitute the primary grounds for its dismal reception. 10 To see that they are insufficient or at least weak grounds for such a reception, we must take a closer look at LP, making special efforts to bring to the surface arguments lurking just below the surface of Rawls's sometimes sketchy or underdeveloped presentation.
III. RAWLS ON PEOPLES AS CORPORATE MORAL AGENTS
In earlier works Rawls set out his view of what justice requires of the basic social structure of peoples bound together by three fundamental, if abstract, ideals: persons or citizens as free and equal, society as a scheme of fair social cooperation between persons or citizens so understood, and social stability as well-orderedness.
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These ideals were expressed through widely shared and highly stable moral intuitions and were latent in the most enduring features of the public political culture shared by those in the post-World War II liberal democratic West. No one in this audience could reasonably reject these ideals. And, on Rawls's view, if properly understood, these ideals required and justified a domestic order that was, more or less, egalitarian, liberal, and democratic.
In LP Rawls takes for granted the existence of liberal democratic peoples, more or less just, and turns his attention to what justice demands of the foreign policies of such peoples. How ought liberal democratic peoples interact with one another if they are to honor the demands of justice?
This question arises for Rawls, whereas it does not for Realists in international relations, because Rawls regards liberal democratic peoples not just as corporate agents, but as corporate moral agents, as persons in the moral sense of the term. When liberal democratic peoples confront one another on the global stage with their conflicting claims they do so not simply as rational corporate agents but as corporate persons or moral agents. And thus they ought always to be ready to resolve their conflicting claims as demanded by justice. It is to highlight this feature of liberal democracies, namely, that their members understand themselves as a body politic to be corporate persons or moral agents, that Rawls refers to them as liberal democratic "peoples" rather than states. As institutions, states, even liberal democratic states, need not be corporate moral persons. As bodies politic, liberal democratic peoples are always corporate moral persons.
Rawls has always insisted that while justice was the virtue governing the institutional resolution of conflicting claims between persons understood as moral agents, individual human persons were not the only persons capable of making conflicting claims upon one another. Corporations, nations, teams, churches and so on might also qualify as persons, and thus legitimately demand and be entitled to just resolutions of their conflicting claims.
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A corporate artificial moral person, a people, must first possess an institutional "body" minimally sufficient to enable it to act on the global stage. This need not but often will be a government operative within a fixed territory. It must also possess to the requisite minimum degree the capacities essential to moral agency.
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On Rawls's view, these are, as is well known, the capacity to form, revise, and pursue a determinate conception of its good, what Rawls calls the capacity for rationality, and the capacity to propose and honor fair terms of cooperative interaction, or the capacity to be reasonable. A people secures the former through its internal culture and deliberative practices when these are sufficiently unified and stable to enable it to form, revise, and pursue rationally a determinate conception of its good. It secures the latter through institutional arrangements and cultural commitments sufficient to enable and incline it to subordinate to the demands of justice the rational pursuit of its own interests in its relations with other persons, whether corporate and artificial or natural.
14 Contemporary liberal democracies more or less just internally satisfy the foregoing conditions. They are, then, not just corporate agents. They are corporate moral agents or persons. They are peoples. And they may legitimately demand and are entitled to justice in their relations with one another.
The question of international justice arises in just the form Rawls presents it as soon as any two liberal democratic peoples make conflicting claims. It is important to underscore here that the question of international justice arises even if there are only liberal democratic peoples in the world. Indeed, Rawls insists, though many find this counterintuitive, that the content of international justice will also be precisely as he presents it even if there are only liberal democratic peoples in the world.
Suppose a world within which there are only liberal democratic peoples. It is tempting to suppose that the principles of international justice are just the principles for fair cooperation these peoples would agree to as liberal democratic peoples, perhaps from an appropriately framed original position. But this would be true only if liberal democratic peoples knew that no other kinds of peoples, no other kinds of bodies politic that qualified as corporate moral agents or persons, had existed or could exist. And this liberal democratic peo-ples do not know. Indeed, they know instead that liberal democratic peoples are not the only kinds of peoples that have existed or might yet still exist.
Consider the following. If the only kind of body politic to qualify as a corporate moral agent or people is a liberal democracy, then questions of international justice are questions only newly placed on the agenda of moral and political philosophy. But this is absurd. For a very long time, certainly a time much longer than the relatively short and recent history of liberal democracies, bodies politic have confronted one another as corporate moral agents, as peoples, demanding and entitled to justice when their claims conflict. This much is presupposed by our moral condemnation of, say, Athens (hardly a liberal democracy by modern lights) in the Melian affair, Spain for its conquests in the Americas, Japan for its relations with China and Korea and Okinawa, (or the Catholic Church for the Crusades or the Inquisition or the recent handling of sexual abuse by priests). While liberal democracies better realize justice internally than nonliberal nondemocratic states, there is no reason to think that liberal democracies constitute the only institutional and cultural possibility through which individual human beings might collectively constitute themselves as peoples bound by and entitled to justice in their relations to other peoples and thus capable of doing injustice for which they are morally responsible.
The point might be made another way. There can be little doubt that a family, team, church, partnership, or business corporation may qualify as a corporate and artificial moral agent or person notwithstanding an internal structure that is neither liberal nor democratic. Why would matters be any different when it comes to bodies politic?
That they cannot be is confirmed by the stance liberal democratic peoples take toward their own past. Liberal democratic peoples typically do not regard themselves as having failed to constitute themselves as corporate moral agents or as peoples until they achieved liberal democracy. Typically they regard themselves as peoples now liberal and democratic but with nonliberal and nondemocratic pasts as peoples. Certainly this is true for the French, English, American, Greek, Japanese, and many other peoples. To be sure, presently liberal and democratic peoples will and should regard their past nonliberal and nondemocratic phases of existence as morally deficient. But they may consistently so regard them and yet also regard their status during those phases as that of a people, even in some sense the same people. 15 Thus, even in a world of only liberal democratic peoples, the problem of international justice must be approached in terms of the relations of peoples generically rather than of liberal democratic peoples alone. In their foreign relations, liberal democratic peoples must meet the demands of justice, and are entitled to justice from others, not because they are liberal democracies, but rather because they are peoples or corporate moral agents. Their moral point of view must, then, admit the possibility of nonliberal and nondemocratic peoples, even in a world where none in fact presently exist.
Of course, some bodies politic will fail to qualify as peoples. Bodies politic constitutionally unwilling or unable to propose and honor fair terms of cooperative interaction, what Rawls calls "outlaw states," may qualify as corporate agents, but will not qualify as corporate moral agents.
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Liberal democratic peoples need not theorize the demands of international justice with these states in mind.
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Groups of human beings unable to achieve and sustain that minimum degree of institutional embodiment necessary to act as a corporate agent at all, whether for material or cultural reasons, will not qualify as corporate moral agents because they will not qualify as corporate agents simpliciter. Rawls calls such groups "burdened societies."
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One can now see more clearly what peoples or corporate moral agents are not. It remains to state more clearly what they are. The key here is that peoples are corporate moral agents, the parts of which are themselves individual human persons or moral agents not human beings simpliciter.
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Within a people, both ruler and ruled are regarded and treated as human persons, even if not free and equal person in the liberal democratic sense. Both share in some meaningful sense in the constitution and governing of a political agency, the authority of which is, in turn, justified by reference to the good of all as real constitutive parts of that agency.
From the fact that a people is a corporate moral agent the parts of which are individual human persons it follows that peoples will constitute and govern themselves internally as genuine systems of cooperation organized or governed by conceptions of justice.
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These need not be liberal or democratic, but they must be genuine systems of cooperation governed by conceptions of justice. Several things follow. First, peoples are always more than a mere system of coordinated social interaction aimed at and justified by reference to some collective or external good. A people is always a system of social cooperation aimed at and justified by reference to the good of its members, all of whom regard themselves and one another as moral persons. There is no place for slavery or servitude within a people. And the subsistence and security interests of all are secure.
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And within a people there is some institutional mechanism through which general information regarding the interests or good of all members is reliably placed before those vested with the authority to make decisions for the collective. There is also some institutional mechanism for the expression of dissent.
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Second, peoples honor internally (the central elements of) the rule of law, including the requirements of formal justice. So much is required by the moral status of members as persons and by the generic demands of justice, whether liberal and democratic or not. Within peoples there is, then, no place for arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, for secret laws, or ex post facto prosecutions. Finally, the legal system is such that it imposes genuine, if sometimes only prima facie, moral obligations to obey.
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Citizens are regarded as moral persons, rational, reasonable, and responsible. And the (moral) authority of the law rests, accordingly, not merely on the internalization by officials of what H. L. A. Hart called secondary rules (of legal recognition and the like), but also on the internalization by citizens generally of those rules (and perhaps the bulk of primary legal rules).
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With the addition of these conditions, Rawls provides a rough and ready account of the range of peoples to which justice is owed in international relations. That range extends from the more or less just liberal democratic peoples to those nonliberal and nondemocratic peoples that meet the foregoing conditions. The latter are said to be "decent" peoples.
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And they together with liberal democratic peoples are said to constitute the class of "wellordered peoples."
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The domestic orders of decent peoples need not be regarded as just to the same degree as those of liberal democratic peoples. And nothing Rawls says suggests he so regards them. He insists only that decent peoples are legitimate to a degree sufficient to place them within the class of bodies politic constituted as corporate moral agents and thereby entitled to justice in their mutual relations. For liberal democracies to regard that class as exhausted by liberal democratic bodies politic alone would be nothing short of manifest hypocrisy.
IV. SELF-SUFFICIENCY, PEOPLES, AND HUMAN PERSONS
Like individual human persons, peoples are moral agents. But unlike individual human persons, peoples are self-sufficient or independent, or at least always potentially so, in a way that individual human persons can never be. Grasping this difference is crucial to seeing the force of Rawls's position on international justice.
Individual human persons literally come to be as persons or moral agents only within and through social cooperation. They are not born, but rather are made. And they are made only through cooperative social institutions. These include the family in some form, various associations and groups, economic institutions, and the body politic within and through which justice is collectively secured. Without these forms of social cooperation, human persons, with their moral capacities and dispositions in good order, could not exist. Nature permits these capacities; it does not deliver them. For this reason we might say that the fundamental interest of all human beings is to realize them-selves as moral persons and thus to secure the cooperative social conditions necessary to secure that status.
Matters are different with respect to peoples. Peoples can both come to be and persist over time as corporate moral agents apart from any cooperation with other peoples, and certainly without any economic cooperation. To be sure, a people may adopt ends unrealizable except through cooperation with other peoples. The point is that the moral status of a people does not depend on cooperation with other peoples. Any, and thus every, people may adopt as its only fundamental end, for example, the internal securing of domestic justice for its members. Thus, assuming that there is no significant territory on Earth within which a group of human persons might not constitute and govern itself as a people, there is no reason in principle why peoples qua peoples must cooperate with one another.
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To be sure, most if not all peoples will cooperate with other peoples. But strictly speaking that cooperation is not presupposed by their status as peoples, as corporate artificial moral agents.
It might be objected here that there is today a global basic structure within which all peoples are enmeshed in a web of interdependencies. Perhaps there is. But the point remains: peoples surely have existed as such in the past apart from cooperation (again, especially economic cooperation) with other peoples. Moreover, if we keep in mind that peoples as such have no fundamental interest in the accumulation of wealth above and beyond that necessary to sustain the institutions essential to their moral status as peoples, then it is not quite so implausible to imagine even today a people constituting itself as such apart from cooperation with other peoples. That all or nearly all presently existing peoples have contingently opted to cooperate for common interests, including wealth accumulation, is beside the point if we are trying to identify the principles of justice governing peoples as corporate moral agents in light of their necessary and fundamental interests.
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Of course, the coercive force deployed within such contingently entered cooperative arrangements must still be justified. This Rawls does not deny. The point is that the principles in terms of which it is justified will look quite different if we keep in mind that peoples need not cooperate to secure their moral status as peoples.
It bears emphasizing here that while all peoples have a fundamental interest in securing material resources, including wealth and income, sufficient to sustain both domestic justice as they understand it and the other requirements of decency or well-orderedness, great wealth, income, or stocks of material resources are not necessary to meet this interest.
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Most existing peoples are drawn into global relations of interdependence within which various states, corporations, and international organizations exercise coercive force for one of three reasons. The first is that they seek wealth and income beyond that necessary to realize and sustain domestic justice and the other requirements of decency or well-orderedness, perhaps having adopted, or their leaders having adopted, materialist and capitalist values, and they are willing to sacrifice some of their independence for access to this wealth and income. The second is that they seek wealth and income as a false substitute for cultural and human resources, the lack of which is the true hurdle they must cross to realize and sustain domestic justice and the other requirements of decency or well-orderedness. The third is that having been impoverished and dispossessed of their material (and very often cultural and human) resources through historical injustice they are in fact what Rawls calls burdened societies, and in a world where decent peoples unjustly fail to meet their obligations of international assistance, these burdened societies have no alternative but to submit themselves to (one hesitates to say "voluntarily participate in") familiar international institutions and practices.
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The reality of existing global interdependencies is a function of many things. But it is not a function of any fundamental interest, most especially not any fundamental interest in wealth accumulation, necessarily shared by all peoples as corporate moral agents.
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It might still be objected here that whether existing peoples are contingently or necessarily enmeshed in a network of global interdependencies, the fact remains that they are universally or near universally so enmeshed. And thus Rawls's position on international justice rests on an empirical falsehood. But this objection misses its mark. Rawls has always insisted on approaching fundamental issues in normative political philosophy from a point of view that takes persons not as they are under existing conditions, but as they might be, given the empirical limits of human psychology, biology, and the like, under conditions that might reasonably be hoped for. The question is whether the idea(l) of peoples as self-sufficient, independent, and autonomous in the sense described above belongs to the moral self-understanding of wellordered peoples and is within the realm of empirical possibility under institutional conditions that might reasonably be hoped for.
It might alternatively be objected that peoples cannot be self-sufficient and independent as corporate moral agents apart from cooperative international relations, for it is within and through such relations that their sovereignty is constituted. But this objection rests on a mistaken conflation between two notions. Whether a people is self-sufficient and independent with respect to its status as a corporate moral agent is one thing. Whether or the extent to which it is properly sovereign over its own affairs as a matter of international justice is another. True, the latter cannot be determined apart from the principles of justice governing international relations. But the former can be. To be sure, a people may find its status as a corporate moral agent affirmed, secured, supported, or otherwise enhanced insofar as it is given recognition by other peoples. Accordingly, the self-respect of peoples as moral agents may profit from mutual recognition among peoples. These are relevant matters when it comes to justice in international relations. But to constitute themselves as corporate moral agents, peoples need not cooperate with one another. They certainly need not cooperate economically. That this is Rawls's view is clear if we recall the fact that he does not characterize the international original position as a forum for settling on principles to govern the distribution of wealth and income as primary goods necessarily produced through and sought by parties from a system of international cooperation. If the moral status of peoples depended on their cooperating with one another in some particular way, then all peoples would possess a common and necessary fundamental interest in some primary good nonrealizable save through international cooperation and to be distributed according to the principles of international justice. That Rawls's view is at least not implausible is confirmed by the facts of history and anthropology. Indeed, as recently as the last century indigenous peoples with no discernible cooperative relations with other peoples yet pretty clearly constituted as corporate moral agents were discovered and stepped onto the global stage of international relations.
V. RECOVERING RAWLS'S ARGUMENT
Rawls's arguments and conclusions depend crucially on the foregoing two features of his view: the idea(l) of peoples, and not just liberal democratic peoples, as corporate moral agents, and the idea(l) of peoples as self-sufficient or independent with respect to their status as corporate moral agents. Importantly, Rawls arrives at these two features of his view without ever giving up the moral point of view of liberal democratic peoples. Liberal democratic peoples in no way compromise their own principles or integrity by recognizing, first, that they are entitled to justice in their relations with one another not because they are liberal and democratic, but rather because they are constituted as peoples; and, second, that while they may cooperate with one another for any number of possible ends, their moral status as peoples is something that does depend necessarily on their cooperating with other peoples.
As one might expect, Rawls continues in LP to make use of the original position argument.
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What one might not expect is that Rawls insists on the need to make use of two separate original position arguments. In the first, only liberal democratic peoples are represented. In the second, only nonliberal and nondemocratic but nevertheless decent peoples are represented. Rawls never offers an original position argument within which both liberal democratic and other decent peoples are together represented behind an appropriate veil of ignorance, so that agents would be unaware of which sort of people they represented. Any principles of international justice arrived at through such an argument would be regarded by both liberal democratic and nonliberal and nondemocratic but otherwise decent peoples as tainted by a sort of compromise with unreason, since each regards the other as deficient with respect to domestic justice.
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Of course, Rawls seeks principles of international justice objectively valid for on all peoples. These principles are arrived at through a constructivist argument that takes as its starting point the normative self-understanding of liberal democratic peoples as corporate moral agents. Given his liberal democratic commitments and this self-understanding, he seeks principles liberal democracies may justifiably regard as consistent with reciprocity in international relations. But the demands of reciprocity are met, he insists, just in case the principles justified in each of the two international original position arguments are the same, as indeed they are, on his view. That the two arguments justify the same principles is a fact of moral significance. It permits all peoples to regard the principles of international justice as untainted by unreason and objectively valid. As the object of something like an international overlapping consensus, then, these principles constitute the core content of public reason in international politics.
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Since all decent peoples may reasonably affirm the principles of international justice that liberal democratic peoples are committed to for themselves, liberal democratic peoples may enforce them without compromising their commitment to the ideal of reciprocity.
Rawls identifies eight principles of international justice.
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They constitute the law of peoples, understood as the moral law binding on all peoples and any system of positive international law they might create. And they largely reflect the post-World War II settlement in international law.
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They do not require of all peoples a liberal democratic domestic order. Indeed, they are fully consistent with nonliberal and nondemocratic but otherwise decent peoples enjoying full membership and good standing in a just international order. They do not require democracy of international associations and organizations. Instead, they permit the parties to such voluntary undertakings to structure them as they see fit in light of their common purposes. And they do not require any constraints on inequalities of wealth or income between peoples within the global economy, except those contained within the ideas of a global social minimum tied to the material requirements of decent (whether liberal and democratic or not) institutions and of free and fair trade.
But here the critics ask: Why would agents representing only liberal democratic peoples in an international original position not agree among themselves simply to internationalize their own shared conception of liberal democratic justice? Agents representing only decent nonliberal and nondemocratic peoples might find themselves able to agree only to Rawls's eight principles. But surely agents representing only liberal democratic peoples will be able to agree to more.
Rawls's position is not vulnerable to this line of attack. But to see why, we need to dig beneath the surface and recover the structure of his argument.
Liberal democratic peoples regard themselves as free, equal, independent, and self-sufficient corporate moral persons. They confront one another in an original position argument, then, free in principle to refrain from cooperation without suffering the catastrophic loss of their status as moral agents. Their situation is not that of the individual human persons represented in the domestic version of the original position argument. In that case, the parties all regard nonagreement not simply as suboptimal, but as morally unacceptable because incompatible with their status as moral agents. Each knows that all need some agreement to establish and govern cooperative interaction. Their task is to settle unanimously on its terms.
In the international case, on the other hand, the parties all regard nonagreement as morally acceptable. To be sure, nonagreement is likely to be neither optimal nor attractive, and the parties accordingly are likely to reach some agreement to establish and govern international cooperation.
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But the reasoning behind that agreement, and thus its content, will reflect the fact that nonagreement is a real possibility for each party to it. Each will be prepared to settle for nonagreement and thus a world within which international interaction is episodic and governed by only passing prudential concerns if the gains promised by each proposed agreement are outweighed by losses to the freedom, equality, or independence of peoples.
Agents representing liberal democratic peoples will agree, of course, to constitute themselves individually and in perpetuity as well-ordered or decent peoples. They will agree to this because they can claim justice for themselves on the global stage only if they are so constituted. Thus, they will agree to honor internally the various requirements that when collectively satisfied qualify them as well-ordered peoples. They'll honor subsistence and security rights and the rule of law. They'll not countenance slavery or serfdom. They'll secure a domestic economy that is mutually advantageous for all classes of participants over time. They'll commit to preserving political institutions reliably able to communicate information about the general interests or good of members to those vested with the authority to make decisions for the collective. They'll commit to preserving some institutional mechanism for the expression of dissent, and a legal system capable of imposing genuine moral obligations to obey the law on citizens.
But why wouldn't they go further and simply agree as a matter of fundamental international justice to constitute themselves individually and in per-petuity as liberal democratic peoples? What would they lose by so doing, since they're already liberal democratic peoples and committed to remaining so? They would lose a morally significant measure of self-determination.
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No people currently liberal and democratic was always thus. Agents representing liberal democratic peoples in an original position will therefore know that liberal democracy is a historical achievement. Indeed, it is the historical nature of their achievement that underwrites the pride liberal democratic peoples typically take in their domestic order. 39 Accordingly, agents representing liberal democratic peoples in an original position will know that a liberal democratic people's status as a corporate moral agent does not depend on its being or remaining liberal and democratic, but depends instead on its meeting the less demanding conditions built into the idea of a well-ordered people. Thus, they will know that their ability to demand justice from other liberal democratic peoples does not depend on their remaining liberal and democratic. Further, they will know that the pride they take in the justice of their own domestic order depends on their having achieved that order on their own terms and in their own way as a people. To secure and preserve their selfdetermination, then, they will not agree to bind themselves to liberal democracy as a matter of fundamental international justice.
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To be sure, they will insist that treaties be honored and that any number of liberal democratic peoples be free through treaty making voluntarily to impose on themselves obligations of international justice that mirror many if not all the core domestic obligations imposed by liberal democratic justice. And they will agree to incorporate such voluntarily assumed treaty-based obligations, once the relevant treaties are entered as surely they will be (as in the European Union), into a regime of enforceable positive international law. But they will not agree to condition their moral status as a people entitled to justice from other peoples upon remaining a liberal democracy. The moral costs of entering into such an agreement, given their knowledge of their own historical progress to liberal democracy as a people, is simply too great. These costs include not just a sacrifice in political autonomy or self-determination, but also in the pride or "amour propre" associated with their own political and cultural achievements.
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Here it is important to keep in mind that the alternative costs of refusing to enter such an agreement are not particularly great. The parties may refuse to agree to bind themselves to liberal democracy as a matter of first principles of international justice and yet still agree to other principles of international justice, thus avoiding complete nonagreement and a world within which international interaction is always at best episodic and governed only by passing prudential concerns. Further, they may refuse to agree to bind themselves to liberal democracy as a matter of first principles of international justice and yet still agree to permit through voluntary undertakings the creation of an enforceable regime of positive international law more robustly liberal and democratic than the first principles of international justice themselves.
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The foregoing affords a clearer view of how agents representing liberal democratic peoples, indeed representing any decent peoples, would reason regarding the demands of international justice. It is this reasoning that underwrites Rawls's positions with respect to international justice and basic human rights, the structure and aims of global civil society, and justice in the global economy.
Here it is crucial to emphasize that the content of international justice is the same, on Rawls's view, whether all peoples in the world are liberal and democratic or not. LP in no way signals any retreat on Rawls's part from his commitment to liberal democracy or to a world within which all peoples are constituted as liberal democracies. For Rawls, first principles of justice, whether in the domestic or international case, serve primarily to mark the boundaries of a morally permissible politics. They do not express a final or complete vision of the just social world. That is the task of politics, not of political philosophy.
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First principles of justice express the parameters within which we must work if we are through politics (constitution making, legislation, adjudication, treaty making, etc.) to arrive at a just social world without violating our most fundamental commitments. Rawls's most fundamental commitment is to reciprocity within a shared human reason. To be a genuine manifestation of human freedom and autonomy, a just social world must be realized by moral agents, natural and corporate, without sacrifice to this commitment. What LP does signal, then, is not some retreat on Rawls's part from liberal democratic commitments, but rather his reaffirmation of the moral foundation of those commitments. Rawls surely hopes for a world within which all peoples are liberal and democratic. But he hopes even more deeply that we can find our way to that world without violating the demands of reciprocity within a shared human reason. Only then will that world belong truly to humanity as its achievement.
VI. FURTHER ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING LP
The core of the complaints commonly lodged against the substantive conclusions reached in LP is that as an articulation of international justice they are too thin to express the basic convictions of liberal democratic peoples with respect to what a just world would look like or what rights all human persons are entitled to simply as persons. They give, critics claim, too little weight to the interests of individual persons and too much weight to the inter-ests of peoples. Rawls responds to this charge, made primarily by his cosmopolitan liberal egalitarian critics, by arguing that it is not possible to know whether his account of international justice is too thin or wrongly captures the balance between the interests of human persons and peoples without begging the very question at hand: What are the principles of international justice? 44 There is some merit to this response, for among the tasks assigned principles of international justice is that of setting the balance between the interests of individual persons and of the bodies politic to which they belong. Although Rawls does not develop this response, I think once developed this response indeed does show that the critics cannot justify their position without begging central questions not begged by Rawls's argument. If I am right, then Rawls has sufficient resources to meet at least the general thrust of one class of commonly raised objections. And so I propose now to develop Rawls's charge that his critics beg central questions.
At the heart of liberalism in the domestic context lies, on Rawls's view, a fact and an ideal. The fact is that of reasonable pluralism with respect to comprehensive doctrines. The ideal is that of reciprocity. Together these do much, but not all, of the work grounding political liberalism as Rawls's favored conception of domestic justice.
Rawls's cosmopolitan liberal egalitarian critics argue that the fact of reasonable pluralism and the ideal of reciprocity dictate some form of liberal democracy as the only reasonable conception of domestic justice not just for us, but for any and every people. Indeed, they point out, Rawls seems himself committed to this claim, at least insofar as he refuses in LP to disavow his own commitment to justice as fairness (or more weakly to any generically liberal conception) as the most reasonable conception of domestic justice. Rawls never suggests that the common good conceptions of justice affirmed by decent but nondemocratic and nonliberal peoples are as reasonable as any generically liberal conception of domestic justice. And he does not think it morally forbidden for liberal democratic peoples to take any steps at all toward the end of liberalizing and democratizing nonliberal and nondemocratic peoples. Critics may charge him with being overly cautious and restrained in this regard, but they cannot charge Rawls with barring liberal democratic peoples from seeking liberalization and democratization through an international politics of persuasion and diplomacy within a context of mutual respect. So, the critics press, Rawls ought simply to acknowledge that nonliberal and nondemocratic peoples are unreasonable and thus ineligible for full membership in good standing in any just international order. 45 Against these critics, Rawls insists that so long as a people satisfies the conditions necessary to constitute itself as a people, the extent to which lib-eral democratic peoples may demand internal reform of it is a matter of international justice, the principles of which are to be arrived at, and from the liberal democratic point of view must be arrived at, from a moral point of view common to all peoples. Here is where Rawls's cosmopolitan liberal egalitarian critics must beg central questions in making their case for more robust principles of international justice.
Consider first the fact of reasonable pluralism. This fact is a claim about the inability of reason in its collective and public deployment to overcome reasonable disagreements, especially doctrinal, with respect to matters moral, religious, and philosophical. These disagreements are the inevitable and unavoidable result of the burdens of judgment. While Rawls has sometimes written as if this fact was a transhistorical permanent fact of the human condition, such a reading is a bit of philosophical speculation that may itself be reasonably rejected. This is because Rawls himself does not extend the fact of reasonable pluralism to science. But the burdens of judgment are as inescapable there as in moral, religious, and philosophical thought. If it is possible to overcome the burdens of judgment and to arrive collectively at truth in science through sustained public exercises of reason, why should matters be any different in morality, religion, or philosophy? There are, of course, various possible answers to this question. The trouble is that each may be reasonably rejected from within a common human reason.
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But if it is not possible to explain in a manner no reasonable person could reject why the burdens of judgment are a permanent and transhistorical source of reasonable doctrinal disagreement in morality, religion, and philosophy, but not in science, then the fact of reasonable pluralism itself, taken as a permanent, transhistorical fact about the human condition but restricted to morality, religion, and philosophy, may be reasonably rejected.
What follows is that the fact of reasonable pluralism is a fact about the foreseeable future under certain historical conditions. Within many societies, including those of Europe and North America with their shared history of religious fragmentation, Enlightenment, modernity, diaspora, and the like, doctrinal consensus in matters religious, moral, and philosophical undeniably lies beyond the reach of public reason for the foreseeable future. Within and for these societies, the fact of reasonable pluralism is just that, a fact, one unlikely to pass any time soon.
But this is not obviously so for all societies or peoples. Those without the relevant history and thus still largely unified through a shared commitment to one or another comprehensive or partially comprehensive doctrine from which they derive their common good conception of justice may not unreasonably maintain that while they can deny neither the reality of simple dis-agreement nor the possibility of reasonable disagreement tout court (and thus must permit a measure of freedom of conscience, thought, and the like), they need not affirm what history has not in fact revealed to them, namely, the fact of reasonable pluralism as Rawls characterizes it for the purpose of theorizing domestic justice within contemporary liberal democracies. From their point of view their common good conception of justice (hostile to liberal democratic rights taken as a unified set or system) will prove unreasonable only if it is assessed against certain features common to the history of liberal democratic peoples. Assessed against their own history and historical reason, it may prove reasonable.
At this point, in order to make use of the fact of reasonable pluralism in an argument for cosmopolitan liberal egalitarian principles of international justice, and to do so without violating their own commitment to reciprocity, Rawls's critics must be able to show that there is no point of view within a common human reason from which the fact of reasonable pluralism can be reasonably rejected. But if we assume that the historical experience of Europe and North America is not the experience of all peoples everywhere, then the only move left to Rawls's critics here is to argue that inevitably all the peoples of the world will come to possess the sort of history and historical reason already possessed by Europe and North America. But what non-questionbegging argument could there be for this claim? The future is open on this question, or at least it is if we do not presuppose an international order already governed by our favored principles of international justice.
A second way in which Rawls's critics must unavoidably beg a central question in order to make their case concerns the idea(l) of persons, whether qua persons or qua citizens, an idea(l) at the justificatory heart of Rawls's domestic liberalism. This idea(l) is one of persons as free and equal, politically and/or morally speaking. In the domestic case, Rawls insists that principles of justice be justified from a moral point of view that models this shared moral self-understanding. And this leads him to liberal democratic principles. Rawls's critics insist that the same reasoning be carried over to the international case, either directly so that the question of international justice is resolved into one concerning the political relations between all individual human persons worldwide as free equals, or indirectly so that the question of domestic justice arises in exactly the same way for all peoples, always as a question regarding the political relations of persons as free equals and thus always requiring a liberal democratic answer.
One difficulty for Rawls's critics here is that this idea(l) of the person as free and equal, whether qua person or citizen, arises out of and would appear to presuppose a certain sort of cultural and institutional background.
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This background includes at least two important elements. The first is some form of the family within which children are able to internalize a roughly like kind and degree of unconditional love and thus come to share a roughly common sense of their self-worth or intrinsic value as individuals. Families of this sort are unlikely to arise unless situated within larger economic arrangements that make it possible for the productive labor of children to be something other than necessary to the survival of the family. The second is some form of civil society within which persons who regard themselves as independent and roughly equal sources of valid moral claims upon one another seek through voluntary associations, bargaining, and the like, to advance their individual and common interests. For peoples lacking sustained historical contact with background conditions within which these two elements are present and enduring features, the idea(l) of the person as free and equal central to the justification of liberal democratic justice will simply have no toehold, it will have no purchase on shared self-understandings or contact with social life as lived and experienced.
To be sure, the background conditions necessary for the idea(l) of persons as moral agents simpliciter are to be found in all peoples, including nonliberal and nondemocratic peoples. All peoples, Rawls insists, are organized as genuine schemes of social cooperation. In both liberal democratic peoples and other decent peoples citizens regard themselves as persons and find their status as persons affirmed in the basic structure of their society. What distinguishes liberal democratic peoples from other decent peoples is that in the former but not the latter citizens regard themselves, at least politically, as free and equal persons who confront one another individually, for the purposes of justifying the basic structure of their society, unmediated by any group memberships. In decent peoples citizens regard themselves as persons who confront one another, even politically, always in ways mediated by their various group memberships. To organize themselves as genuine schemes of social cooperation, decent peoples need not meet the demands appropriate to those who regard social cooperation as fundamentally between persons as free and equal individuals. They need only meet the looser or different demands appropriate to those who regard social cooperation as fundamentally between persons who confront one another always as members of various groups. Accordingly, decent peoples may permit much that would be excluded within a liberal democracy. But this need not be inconsistent with or corrosive of the moral personhood of their citizens. If it were, persons as moral agents would be a relatively new phenomenon in human history, arriving only in the last five hundred years or so.
In an important sense, then, the rights essential to liberal democratic conceptions of domestic justice are an effect and not the cause of the underlying social processes that construct the sort of persons presupposed by such con-ceptions of justice. It is because the family and civil society (and economic production) developed in particular ways in Europe, North America, and elsewhere that human beings were made into the sort of persons fitted for and inclined to demand the panoply of rights at the heart of liberal democratic justice and citizenship. Assuming that some peoples have developed in ways significantly different, there would appear to be no non-question-begging way for Rawls's critics to deploy, without violating the demands of reciprocity, the idea(l) of persons as free and equal in any argument for more robustly liberal and democratic principles of international justice. Again, they might claim that inevitably all peoples will find themselves in substantial contact with the sort of background conditions from which arises the liberal democratic idea(l) of persons. But the future would appear to be open on that question, at least so long as we resist the temptation to define the future from the start in terms of a particular candidate conception of international justice.
The upshot here is that even if we begin with our gaze fixed squarely on the foundational need to identify principles of justice for resolving conflicting claims between individual human persons, wherever they may be, there is no path, nonviolative of the ideal of reciprocity, to principles of international justice more robustly liberal and democratic than Rawls's own. With respect to political justice, moral personhood is understood differently within different peoples. And neither history nor a common human reason show decisively that a people must be liberal and democratic to secure for its members the social conditions necessary to their moral status as persons, not free and equal persons, but just persons. Beyond membership in a decent people, whether liberal democratic or otherwise, the fundamental interests of human persons are historically, socially, and contingently given, and not necessarily universally shared. 48 And for this reason it is not the job of political philosophy to make all the world liberal and democratic, but rather the job of a morally legitimate international politics. It is the conditions of such a politics that Rawls sets out in LP.
Rawls's critics face the following difficulty. They can insist on framing issues of international justice in terms of the just relations between individual human persons. But if they do so, they must confront the fact that individual human persons share globally no self-understanding or idea(l) of persons as free equals morally and politically speaking. To ground principles of international justice in such a self-understanding or idea(l) is to sacrifice (out of impatience?) the liberal commitment to reciprocity within a common human reason on the altar of one's preferred conception of international justice. A theory of international justice faithful to the idea(l) of reciprocity within a common human reason will ground itself in an idea(l) of persons no more robust than that to be gleaned from the idea(l) of well-ordered peoples as cor-porate moral agents and central to international political culture as it has developed over the last several hundred or even thousand years. But what this idea(l) requires is that each human is afforded the social conditions necessary to personhood. And these are marked by membership in a well-ordered people, whether liberal democratic or decent but nonliberal and nondemocratic.
Basic human rights are just those rights necessary to meet our fundamental interest in such membership. They set out, as Rawls puts it, the necessary conditions to be met by any genuine scheme of cooperation among persons.
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Like natural rights, they are universal and prepolitical. In contrast to natural rights, they are not deduced from natural facts about the human condition.
50
Nor are they deduced from practical reason.
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Instead, they are constructed out of the normative and shared self-understanding of a particular kind of corporate moral agent, liberal democratic peoples. True, Rawls's basic human rights fall well short of the full list included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the two Covenants or other human rights documents or treaties. Nevertheless, they are not insignificant. Their realization would go a long way to eliminating the worst of human suffering, requiring a world within which all peoples were constituted as something like Kant's constitutional republics or Hegel's ethical states. Further, nothing in Rawls's account of basic human rights precludes the realization through political undertaking and positive law of additional rights as universal human rights.
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History may bring us to a point at which all decent peoples are liberal and democratic and thus all individuals worldwide think of themselves in their political relations as free equals. But if so, I suspect that individuals will still think of themselves as free and equal members of distinct and diverse corporate moral agents or peoples, with their own histories and achievements and institutions and views on the demands of liberal democratic justice. And thus the question of international justice will continue to present itself as one fundamentally concerned with the relations between peoples.
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For liberal democratic peoples owe one another justice not because they are liberal and democratic, but because they are peoples. As such they seek political autonomy. Thus the first principles of international justice will remain something like what Rawls says they are, so long as we remain committed to justice as reciprocity. Of course, in a world of liberal democratic peoples and self-understandings, Rawls's principles likely will have long faded into the "taken for granted" landscape against which the real political work of justice unfolds. This would be a world fully purged of the great evils that plague our own.
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There is nothing relativistic or unduly multicultural about Rawls's approach here. He affirms justice as reciprocity as binding universally between all moral agents, whether natural individuals or corporate artificial agents. It is true that he allows for the possibility of nonliberal and nondemocratic corpo-rate moral agents.
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But he does so for reasons liberal democratic peoples themselves affirm, reasons that figure in their own historical self-understanding. And it is true that he argues for liberal democratic tolerance of decent nonliberal and nondemocratic peoples. But this tolerance is rooted in the ideal of reciprocity within a common human reason conjoined with something like the international analogue of the fact of reasonable pluralism. Finally, it is true that Rawls prohibits liberal democracies from engaging in a number of coercive measures, including the offering of financial incentives, to secure the liberalization or democratization of decent nonliberal and nondemocratic regimes. But this is not because Rawls has lost the courage of his liberal democratic convictions. It is rather because those convictions commit him to an international politics of mutual respect and persuasion, voluntary exchange and interaction, rather than manipulation and coercion, among free and equal well-ordered peoples. Within such a politics, liberal democratic peoples are free to engage in a variety of undertakings aimed at promoting liberalism and democracy around the world.
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Bribery and radical isolation are, however, along with military force, inconsistent with such a politics, and a liberal democratic international order won through such undertakings is hardly worth celebrating as a human achievement. Decent peoples must be free to liberalize and democratize in their own way and this means that liberal democratic peoples must engage in an international politics of persuasion and mutual respect always prepared to accept a world within which decent nonliberal and nondemocratic peoples choose to remain as such.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Rawls's effort in LP has not been well received. I have defended LP through two strategies. First, I drew out and then defended two key assumptions regarding the nature of peoples. I then put those assumptions to work in a reconstructed account of the reasoning of agents representing liberal democratic peoples in an international original position. Second, I offered some supplemental lines of argument consistent with Rawls's overall political philosophy but not properly found within LP to support its conclusions, especially as against its cosmopolitan liberal egalitarian critics. These arguments have their common basis in the facts of history and the liberal idea(l) of reciprocity within a common human reason.
My aim throughout has been primarily to suggest that LP is a richer and more formidable philosophical target than typically acknowledged by those who take aim at it. But my aim has also been to undermine the view that in LP Rawls made a significant departure from, perhaps even betrayed, his earlier work. On my view LP is very much of a piece with that work. That the merits of LP have been so regularly misdiagnosed is powerful evidence for the prevalence of incomplete or inaccurate understandings of both the spirit and substance of that earlier work. Rawls never held that there is a philosophical argument for liberal democracy that all must affirm at pains of irrationality. 58 Indeed, it is no accident that he titled his first book A Theory of Justice and not The Theory of Justice.
History sometimes reveals what philosophy cannot find on its own. The task of the political philosopher is to gather what history has revealed to reason and rationally reconstruct it so that humanity might move forward, creating and recreating itself, within the limits of a common human reason. In this way, philosophy serves freedom.
NOTES pendent moral requirements. An economy might fail to secure mutual advantage over time and still generate sufficient material resources and wealth to meet the basic human rights of all citizens. And an economy might fail to generate sufficient wealth for this purpose but still manage to secure the mutual advantage of all classes of participants. To constitute and present itself on the global stage as a corporate artificial moral agent or person, a well-ordered people, a people must organize its domestic economy to meet both these conditions. Second, Rawls insists that all peoples have a right to the material resources and wealth necessary to becoming and remaining well-ordered and thereby realizing themselves as corporate moral agents or persons. A people must honor basic human rights, including subsistence and security rights, and must secure the rule of law and much else in order to be well-ordered and thus qualify as a corporate moral agent or person. These are not insignificant or cost-free undertakings. And peoples without access to the requisite level of material resources or wealth, certainly if this is through no fault of their own, have a right to aid from those peoples not similarly situated. The latter are under a duty to provide such aid.
Third, all well-ordered peoples must refrain from acting, whether individually or through their voluntary associations, in ways certainly or likely to disable any people from itself becoming or remaining well-ordered. See LP, 43. With respect to global or international economic justice, then, Rawls's view is not without teeth. Still, it is a far cry from the views put forward by many so-called cosmopolitan liberals or egalitarians.
8. For Rawls's view of international voluntary associations, see LP, 42-43. 9. The three substantive complaints against LP just reviewed are, of course, complaints also against the contemporary status quo in international relations. Thus, it is tempting to characterize Rawls's efforts in LP as merely an attempt to defend that status quo, to show that the real is rational, so to speak. There is some truth to this claim; Rawls does aim in LP to provide a philosophical justification for the post-World War II settlement in international relations. But taken by itself this claim would be an overstatement or mischaracterization of Rawls's aim and achievement in LP. Rawls's more important aim is to ground for all peoples a reasonable and not unrealistic hope for the possibility of a just international order. See LP, [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] 10. Of course other relatively unexplored difficulties might remain: for example, Rawls's failure to discuss under nonideal theory the demands of corrective justice in the postcolonial setting.
11. See, for example, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); John Rawls, Political Liberalism, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993 ), 1996 . As early as 1963 Rawls had written, "[t] he term 'person'is to be understood in a general way as a subject of claims. In some cases, it means human individuals, but in others it refers to nations, corporations, churches, teams and so on. Although there is a certain logical priority to the case of human individuals, the principles of justice apply to the relations among all these types of persons, and the notion of a person must be interpreted accordingly." "Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice." reprinted in Collected Papers, edited by Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 75.
13. For Rawls's discussion of the conditions necessarily satisfied by peoples as corporate artificial moral agents, see LP, 23-25, 61-70. 14. One advantage of Rawls's approach here is that it allows us to speak straightforwardly of the Palestinian or Kurdish or Navajo peoples as entitled, as peoples, to just treatment within the global order. While none of these peoples enjoys institutional embodiment in the form of a state, all have sufficient institutional embodiment, as well as the requisite moral capacities, to qualify as peoples in Rawls's framework.
15. That this is Rawls's view is suggested by his discussion of the pride liberal democratic peoples may take in their past achievements. See, for example, LP, 34, 62. 16. LP, 90. 17 . Outlaw states are the corporate body politic analogue not to the domestic individual criminal who possesses the capacity to be reasonable but fails to perfectly realize it (and who is therefore owed justice in punishment), but rather to the sociopath who fails to possess the capacity to be reasonable to the requisite minimum degree and is thus properly quarantined and offered appropriate forms of care.
18. LP, 90. There are two main reasons a group might find itself unable to constitute itself as a corporate agent simpliciter. The first is that it is so internally divided that it constitutes at best a confederation or alliance of separate peoples, each acting in pursuit of its own determinate conception of the good and bound together by no shared conception of a common good but rather by only a strategic alliance in pursuit of separate goods. A political association so divided is not what Rawls means by a "burdened society." By "burdened society" Rawls means to suggest a second kind of case, where what prevents a group from constituting itself as a corporate moral agent is material or cultural poverty. Here the analogue in the domestic context is the human being so severely disabled-physically, psychologically, what have you-as to be incapable of agency at all. It is important to note here that Rawls affirms a duty of assistance in the international case obligating more fortunate peoples to assist burdened societies in achieving the material and cultural conditions necessary to corporate moral agency. Presumably some such analogous duty arises in the domestic case as well, though this has been a subject of much dispute among those working on issues concerning disability and justice within Rawls's political philosophy. 19. LP, [65] [66] . On the requirement that a common good conception of justice be still a conception of justice, see LP, 71. See also the helpful discussion by Chris Naticchia in his "Human Rights, Liberalism and Rawls's Law of Peoples," Social Theory and Practice 24, no. 3 (1998): 345-77, esp. sec. 4. 21. Since persons are perfectly able to starve or suffer abuse without social cooperation, social cooperation must improve their situation in these respects to meet the minimal demands of mutual advantage.
22 Press, 1994) . To impose genuine (legal) obligations, on Hart's view, the officials within a legal system must have internalized a system of secondary rules, including a rule of recognition, and must enforce a legal regime of primary rules with a certain minimum natural law content (at least so long as we hold constant the contingent empirical facts descriptive of human beings and their basic social condition). Rawls includes but goes beyond these conditions in his account of peoples as corporate moral agents. To constitute itself as a corporate moral agent or people, a society must possess a legal system capable not just of imposing genuine legal obligations in Hart's sense, but capable also of imposing genuine moral obligations to obey the law. This condition is met when citizens as moral persons internalize the rules fundamental to their legal regime. In his discussion of these matters, Rawls does not mention Dworkin's account of associative obligations, but there are noteworthy similarities. For Dworkin's account of associative obligations and the conditions a body politic must meet to generate them, see his Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), chap. 6. 25. Rawls discusses at length only one type of decent people, so-called decent consultation hierarchies, but he allows for the possibility of other decent peoples. See LP, 63. Oman suggests itself as a decent consultation hierarchy.
26. LP, 63. 27. See, for example, LP, 106-13. Two further points following from this fact about peoples and their cooperation bear mentioning here. The first is that this fact explains why Rawls regards issues of international or global justice as issues concerning how to extend liberal democratic (domestic) justice to related but nonparadigm concerns. The second is that it explains why Rawls offers no list of primary goods to be distributed according to the principles settled on by agents in an international original position; there are no generic goods that all peoples, simply qua peoples, necessarily seek through cooperation with other peoples, since there is no reason all peoples must necessarily cooperate with other peoples.
28. That so many readers of Rawls assume that all peoples must have a fundamental interest in wealth accumulation above and beyond that necessary to sustain just institutions is itself a testament to the extent to which capitalist values ensnare us all. To Rawls's credit, he always insisted that no people has a necessary interest in wealth accumulation once it has met the demands of justice, including the requirements of just savings. Once those demands are met, a people is free to devote itself to securing for its members the social conditions necessary to the art of living, conditions requiring no further wealth accumulation. This was Rawls's hope for liberal democracies. See Rawls, Theory of Justice, sec. 44. That existing peoples have all contingently opted for further wealth accumulation is evidence of the power and allure of capitalist values, but it is beside the point when the question at hand is the first principles of justice governing the relations between peoples as corporate moral agents.
29. LP, 106-9. For discussion of the idea that states need less wealth and income than is often supposed to secure decent domestic orders, and that cultural and human resources are often more important than wealth and income when it comes to securing such orders, see the works of Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor, 1999), or Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
30. Rawls makes it plain that burdened societies ought not be treated in this way; instead, they ought to receive the aid to which they are entitled so that their participation in international cooperative undertakings might properly be an expression of their political autonomy. Further, Rawls expresses some sympathy for the voluntary development by well-ordered peoples of Pogge's proposed "Global Resource Dividend" as an institutional mechanism through which they might discharge their duty of assistance of burdened societies. See LP, 119 . What is striking is that while Rawls and his critics, Allen Buchanan, for example, supra, agree in their condemnation of current practices (e.g., International Monetary Fund) through which burdened societies are subjected to various coercive measures as a condition of their receiving the aid they need to realize and sustain themselves as well-ordered peoples, Rawls seeks, unlike Buchanan and other critics, to displace this injustice by insisting on the genuine realization of a duty to aid that aims to transform burdened societies into politically autonomous well-ordered peoples rather than to take for granted the coercive nature of international relations and then seek to justify it by subordinating it to principles of justice (determined under the assumption that the international order is, like the domestic order, fundamentally nonvoluntary and coercive).
31. It is easy to be misled by Rawls's attribution to agents in the domestic original position argument of a fundamental interest in securing the greatest share of wealth and income possible from the distribution of the cooperative surplus. Agents in the domestic original position argument represent parties who must cooperate in various ways, including economically, to secure the social conditions essential to their status as moral agents or persons. There are good reasons, then, to attribute to these agents a fundamental interest in wealth and income and to describe candidate principles of justice in terms of how they distribute certain primary goods, including wealth and income, generated by cooperation. But it does not follow that real human persons have an interest in securing as much wealth and income as possible. Surely Rawls nowhere endorses such a view. More importantly, the reasoning behind assigning agents in the domestic original position a fundamental interest in securing as much wealth and income as possible does not carry over to the international original position. There agents represent parties who need not cooperate economically to secure the social conditions essential to their status as moral agents or corporate persons. Accordingly, there is no reason to describe candidate principles of international justice in terms of how they distribute wealth and income created through international cooperation. So long as agents represent well-ordered peoples, that cooperation be voluntary is all they will demand.
32. The original position argument functions as a heuristic valuable for the purpose of determining theoretically and generally what it is that our fixed points as liberal democratic peoples commit us to with respect to issues of international justice or a just foreign policy.
33. For Rawls's discussion of this matter, see LP, 57, [68] [69] [70] 115. 34. Ibid., . Ibid., 37. 36. They require respect for and between peoples as free, equal, and independent, the honoring of basic human rights (a smallish subset of liberal democratic civil rights covering, inter alia, subsistence and security, the rule of law and formal justice, the right to private property, and certain basic liberties such as freedom of conscience and religion), compliance with treaties, nonintervention except to stop gross and systemic violations of basic human rights, nonaggression, a commitment to the principles of jus in bello when fighting a defensive war, free and fair trade, and international aid sufficient to ensure for all human beings the opportunity for membership in a decent people able to sustain itself over time as a decent people.
37. After all, peoples do have fundamental interests that can be advanced through international cooperation on terms acceptable to all as fair or just. These interests are in territorial integrity and security, the preservation of their decent domestic institutions and practices, cultural development, insurance against certain risks of natural disaster and the like, and their "amour propre" and self-respect. For Rawls's discussion of the fundamental interests of peoples, see LP, 18, 29, 34. 38. Once a people is well-ordered, on Rawls's view, its fundamental interest is in preserving its political autonomy. See LP, 118. 39. LP, 34. Rawls also suggests the axiological claim that the value of diverse cultural patterns and institutional arrangements arises to some significant degree from their status as genuine manifestations of collective self-determination of peoples. See LP, 61, 84, 111. 40. Importantly, Rawls leaves open the possibility that there may be compelling empirical reasons, of the sort discussed by Amartya Sen and others, for thinking there is a universal human right to democratic institutions. See LP, p. 75, n. 16, and p. 79 . Whether the relevant empirical claims can be established is, of course, still an open question.
41. Rawls writes suggestively sometimes as if the value of diverse cultural and political achievements was constituted in some measure as an axiological matter by their being the fruits of collective self-determination. See, for example, LP, 61, 84, 111. 42. The realistic utopia described by Rawls's law of peoples is not a static world within which politics, whether international or domestic, has come to an end. It's rather a world within which all politics unfolds under conditions of freedom.
43. See LP, p. 4, n. 4, and p. 6, n. 8 46. Suppose the explanation offered is that for various reasons reason itself is able to penetrate more fully and comprehend more accurately the physical, natural, or material world than it is the moral, religious, or philosophical world. This may be true, but it is hard to imagine an account of this asymmetric ability of reason to penetrate and comprehend these worlds that could not itself be reasonably rejected. Suppose alternatively one revises the fact of reasonable pluralism so that it is a claim not just about the permanence of reasonable (especially doctrinal) disagreements in morality, religion, and philosophy, but in science as well. Again, this may be true, but it is hard to imagine an account of the symmetric inability of reason to penetrate and comprehend the worlds of science, morality, religion, and philosophy that could not itself be reasonably rejected. The lesson is that construed as a permanent and transhistorical fact about the human condition, the fact of reasonable pluralism is a matter over which reasonable people may disagree.
47. This point is made by Chris Brown in his "Universal Human Rights: A Critique," in Human Rights in Global Politics, edited by T. Dunne and N. Wheeler (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
48. It might be objected here that talk of persons simpliciter rather than of persons as free equals is just the sort of metaphysical talk Rawls now rejects as appropriate to theorizing justice, whether domestic or international. But there is nothing metaphysical at all about the idea of persons simpliciter rather than as free equals. Both are moral conceptions. And either may be cast as a political conception, latent within a shared public political culture and manifest in ongoing practices widely supported and stable moral intuitions. Within the global context, the idea(l) of persons or citizens as free equals is itself both relatively new and pretty clearly not universal if even very widely shared. The idea(l) of the well-ordered people as a corporate moral agent the members of which are persons, rational, reasonable, and responsible, even if not fundamentally organized as free and equal individuals, is, however, quite old and pretty clearly very widely shared, even if not universal. There is nothing metaphysical here, just distinct political and moral ideals latent within and manifest through history.
49. LP, 68. And they include those rights necessary to implement the paradigm fundamental or human rights. Thus, the rights set out in the conventions on genocide and Apartheid are basic or fundamental rights. See LP, 80. 50. The human condition is far too malleable to support any such deduction. As Rawls notes, the goodness of human nature lies in the fact that it permits the acquisition of the capacities and dispositions essential to a just social world as determined by a common or shared human reason. See LP, 7. 51. LP, 86-87. 52. Nothing in Rawls's conception of basic human rights commits him to the view that those rights articulated in either of the two Covenants and taken on by all peoples through the positive act of signing are something other than universal human rights. Rawls's conception simply permits a distinction between those universal human rights the universality of which depends on such positive political acts and those of which it doesn't. This distinction is not implausible. No people, I suspect, takes pride in securing for itself the human rights Rawls identifies as basic. Securing such rights is a moral prerequisite to a people's status as a moral agent. But many peoples, perhaps all, including liberal democratic peoples, take great pride in securing for themselves those human rights that are central to the Universal Declaration or the two Covenants but not found on Rawls's list. They take pride in their securing these rights, for example, to free public education, because they regard the securing of them as among their morally praiseworthy achievements as corporate artificial moral agents.
A related feature of Rawls's conception of human rights is that it leaves space for the longstanding political practice of state parties signing human rights treaties with expressed reservations, at least with respect to those rights to which they're not otherwise committed under the principles of international justice or existing international law. And it leaves space for the not
